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Law, Authority and Critique in the Wake of Terra
Nullius: A History of 'Profane Illumination' or an
Economy ofViolence?
Bernhard Ripperger

For histrionic or fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious takes
us no further; we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize It
in the everyday world, by virtue of a dIalectical optic that perceives the
everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday (R: 189-190).1

Prologue

Terra nullius is the principle of a violence that inheres in every origin. And, in
its wake, there is no law, no text, no culture, free of that violence. The origin is
no accident. Terra nullius is not an historical error. Our conceptual legacy is
the unsettled and unsettling history of this violence. It demands critical...
thinking...Or else..we are condemned to repeat this origin again and again.
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Introduction

What this paper hopes to explore is what is both essential and obscure in the
constellation provided by the above quotation, the constellation made up of the
concepts of violence, fate and justice. 2 This paper is driven by concern over a
central paradox that appears within this constellation so construed: if terra
nullius is not an historical error, if it stands as the origin of a certain history, can
its repetition ever be avoided? If no law, text or culture is free of that violence
how can we explain the ovenhrowing (if only symbolically at this stage) of terra
nullius, except as a reiteration of violence, a violence that is itself without a
ground?
The basic puzzle that this paper hopes to highlight is the question of how an
approach that locates a violence in every origin, the view that there is a
performative violence at the origin of every history, one that is inevitably
reiterated throughout the subsequent history - an economy of violence - can
even conceive of the possibility of meaningful critique. In particular, what is
obscured by such a conceptualisation is the possibility of an intra-historical
learning process, the gradual and fallible disentangling of violence and nonviolence; in other words the pOSSibility of progressive emancipation and the
prospect of happiness.
To enable this possibility we need more than a diagnostic based on a simple
negation of the violence of the origin; and indeed, those approaches which
demonstrate the most intense diagnostic sensitivity also exhibit complex insight
into ethical-normative principles that can be used to justify critique. However, if
critique is to be meaningful, it has to be more than an abstract negation - and
one of the effects of an economy of violence is the incapacity to conceive of a
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progressive though fallible normative learning process that renders concrete
these ethical-normative principles. This has the double effect of a reductive
understanding of violence which is thereby able to operate autonomously and
anonymously throughout law, text and culture, coupled to an ethical impulse
which cannot be brought into effect within history through the intended
actions of concrete social beings. That is, an economy of violence, as implied in
the above quotation, in fact reinstates a bad metaphysics:
...if history has to become the Other of history in order to escape the system of
delusion...then the critique of the historical present moment turns into a
critique of historical being - the latest form of a theological critique of the
earthly vale of tears (Wellmer 1991: 63).
The argument here will be that approaches that ascribe to an economy of
violence must, in order to maintain their intense diagnostic sensitivity, either
secretly employ a concept of a learning process which itself they cannot
account for, or else lack both the normative content and heuristic facility
needed to support their claims. Accordingly, any such approach that seeks to
avoid resignation or cynicism, that is which seeks to maintain the emancipatory
ideal, needs to reconsider whether their ontological commitment does not
render their critical ambitions untenable.
This paper aims to address this claim through an examination of the work of
Walter Benjamin. Benjamin's struggle with Romantic, metaphysical, anarchist,
Marxist and Messianic elements in his understanding of violence, language and
history provides a unique opportunity for such an investigation, and ultimately
gives us reasons to prefer a notion of 'profane illumination' to an economy of
violence in our understanding of justice, history and law.
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The Economy ofViolence

Violence, irrationality, negativity, and absence as characterisations of the
ground of human activity, history and language arise initially as an attempt to
overcome certain difficulties of more conventional metaphysics. Indeed such
accounts have a long tradition: Plotinus, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger
and Derrida all engage with such a figure of thought albeit in different ways.
Other theorists have regarded the violence of human nature as a state to be left
behind or contained in a condition of freedom, with Hobbes being the most
famous proponent. StilI others invoke various distinctions and injunctions in
order to overcome the competition they see between the violence (of either
the mechanical determinism or, by contrast, the randomness) of nature and
freedom, as we find in Kant; yet, apparently unavoidably, violence has unsettled
all such attempts, as testified in Rousseau's dictum that we can be forced to be
free.
In the twentieth century, three influential theoretical perspectives have
irreversibly undermined faith in the possibility of purifying human activity and
history of violence, by demonstrating the ineradicable violence inherent in
every such metaphysical ambition itself. In the Dialectic ofEnlightenment,
Adorno and Horkheimer reveal the violence involved in every act of
conceptualisation; Foucault demonstrates the constitutive presence of power in
every discourse; Derrida too points to the violence that takes place in practices
of signification. At the same time, all three perspectives share a commitment to
critique and the emancipatory ideal, whether in the form of 'enlightening the
Enlightenment about itself, the rescuing of subjugated and local knowledges or
the practice of deconstruction.
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Despite the diversity, complexity and insight of all three perspectives, a
common problem inheres in their approach. All three partake, not necessarily
willingly, in the ontological project of an economy of violence; that is, they
ground an economy of violence anterior to history, beyond the sphere of
influence of subjects capable of thought and action, in a mythic relationship of
violence whose authority is reinstated even in the attempt to try and break free.
However, although they provide a convincing argument that the metaphysical
puritanism which seeks to purge humanity of violence is itself a violence, to
conceive the issue in this way, such that violence is unavoidable, is to remain
within the confines of such a metaphysics. To in turn ontologise violence is to
be in secret affinity with this metaphysical desire: the idea of a performative
violence that is at the basis of all distinctions itself reinvokes the metaphysical
myth of a founding of meaning and history from out of an undifferentiated,
effusive or indeterminate state which is somehow able to be projected behind
or beneath all such existing meanings or distinctions. However convincing
specific examples of this phenomenon are, the totalising impulse within this
transcendental argument leads, as we will see, into a vicious circle of
undialectical affirmations and negations which tends to bring about the
conditions within history that it presupposes as the basis of history (CfWellmer
1991: 87).
The consequence of an economy of violence is a singular inability to explain
how it is possible to bring about a transformation of the conditions of humanity
that would not reinstate the same violence under a different guise; that is, how
to break through myth and into history where emancipation is possible. Note
that such a problem raises a radical question for these theorists themselves;
how is their own position of critique possible? What is it that enables the
privileging of their own perspective as that of critique? All three provide an
answer to this question, analyses of which go far beyond the scope of this
paper; however, it will be argued that they can only do so if they implicitly
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abandon the ontological conception of an economy of violence. In its place we
should recognise that we find ourselves within a world, history, language (and
often more than one) in which the conditions of humanity (such as the body,
power, meaning and desire - violence also) are disclosed, and which can be
disclosed anew, but which can neither be made nor unmade in their entirety as
a totality (Wellmer 1991: 70). Now, with this 'disenchantment' of violence, the
recognition that violence is a part of this world and so distinguished from its
own Other (that is, non-violence),
it would no longer be possible to assert...that the will to truth is in itself a will
to power; that dialogue as such is symbolic violence; that speech which is
oriented towards truth is terror; that moral consciousness as such is a reflex of
internalized violence; or that the autonomous human being as such is either a
fiction or a mechanism of auto-suppression (Wellmer 1991: 70).

Or that law as such is an economy of violence.
Rather, it means that we can attempt to identify an historically situated
normative learning process, progressive though fallible, that through
determinate negations of specific experiences of violence and injustice can
allow an insight into the necessary conditions of possible emancipation and
happiness (without Utopian projections to either a past or future origin); and it
is such an idea that enables the practice of critique.
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Benjamin on Violence, Language and History
(1) Violence
In Benjamin's work, the struggle between fate and history, myth and
experience, violence and hope is ineliminable, and his text, Critique oj
Violence, contains these tensions in a prototypal fashion. This early work is
simultaneously a text that: reveals the violence that first makes and then
preserves the law; calls for its demystit'ication; then totalises its history as the
mythic perpetuation of violence; raises the hope of a 'pure' revolutionary
violence, but promptly locates such a hope beyond history and human
understanding in the realm of the divine. As such it exemplifies both the
insights and limitations of an economy of violence approach.
This text operates through a consideration of Gewalt, which can mean both
force and illegitimate force, or violence (or, both legitimated force and
violence). For Benjamin, traditional legal theory has approached the question of
how to apply this distinction with respect to the force of law from two, equally
untenable, directions. Natural law is concerned with ends; 'just' ends will be
able to legitimate any means to such ends. Positive law, however, guarantees
the justness of the ends by attending to an evaluation of the means (R: 278). Yet
for Benjamin, neither approach can provide a position from which we can
evaluate the meaning of any distinction between sanctioned and unsanctioned
violence without having already presupposed a symmetry between just means
and just ends: natural law allows just ends to annul the violence of the means
(an argument already shown to be spurious in Hegel's critique of the postrevolutionary terror in France), an argument which avoids the issue of
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evaluating the violence employed to establish the criterion of 'just ends'
originally; positive law similarly obscures the fact that the evaluative criteria
used to determine the justness of the means were themselves decided upon
prior to the establishment of such criteria. Both approaches thereby occlude
the consideration of a sphere of violence; they are unable to examine the role
of violence in establishing these crucial distinctions. Benjamin therefore argues
that only a historico-philosophical view of law, one that examines both how
these distinctions come into being and how they operate, can explain how a
il!legitimate criterion can be applied to violence at all (R: 279).
Benjamin rejects outright the natural law position that the justness of ends
decides the question of violence. His concern shifts to violence as a means, and
the question of whether there is a symmetry between justified means and just
ends (a question made possible by the experience of conscription in World War
One) (R: 278). As a means, violence can pursue either natural or legal ends (R:
280). In examining the law's regulation of the pursuit of ends, Benjamin reveals
the interest held by law in the monopoly on violence. That is, he concludes
from the fact that the law limits the pursuit of natural ends, not the standard
liberal doctrine of the state attempting to bring about the harmonising of
conflicting goals, but instead that there is an intention on the part of the law to
preserve itself, to perpetuate its domination over the dissemination of violence
(R: 281).
This desire is revealed by examining certain contradictions in the legal situation
(not the law as such), such as the notions of the (general) strike and military
violence. What analysis of these situations demonstrates, is that law fears the
existence of extra-legal violence, violence directed to natural ends (equally in
the 'extortion' for better conditions or in the predatory quest for greater
possessions), as this has itself a lawmaking character (R: 283). That is, such
violence threatens the existent form of law and order of legal ends, the
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prevailing order of dissemination of violence, with the possibility of a new
economy; a new order which will legitimate this founding violence
retrospectively (Derrida 1992: 35).
Law's reaction to the threat of this first function of violence, lawmaking
violence, is the attempt to bring its operation within the sphere of legal
relations. It does this by constructing legal ends with which the violent pursuit
of natural ends will inevitably collide, such as when a right to strike is granted
(to limit the force of organised labour) or rules of war created (to sanction
victory and secure recognition of the new possessions). This second function of
violence, which Benjamin terms law-preserving, refers to the forms of violence
employed towards legal ends; and as these ends are defined according to the
existing order, the violence of the means to these legal ends functions
(threateningly) as the preservation of current forms oflaw, and so indeed oflaw
itself.
The cooperation, or interdependence of these two forms of violence appear in
such institutions as the police, and in capital punishment:
For if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the origin of law, then it may be
readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life and death,
occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely into
existence... Its purpose is not to punish the infringement of the law but to
establish new law. For in the exercise of violence over life and death more than
in any other legal act, law reaffirms itself (R: 286).

Law is thus permeated throughout by Violence; even the contract, which attests
to the unforced agreement of two parties, points to the potential violence of its
enforceability (R: 288).
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The function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking
pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be established as law,
but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss violence; rather, at this
very moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an end
unalloyed by violence, but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under
the title of power (R: 295).
Law arises from an originary, law-making violence which establishes the criteria
for the legality of ends: the operation of law preserving violence (rather than
the nature of the ends themselves) completes the fatal entanglement of law and
violence, for it means that we cannot distinguish between the force of law of an
authorised power and the violence that first established this authority (Derrida
1992: 6). This unavoidable entanglement, this fated repetition of the original
violence, is intrinsic to law, and is why Benjamin describes law as a mythical
violence.
Accordingly, the result of Benjamin's historical investigation of the basis of law
is the formulation of an ontological concept of an economy of violence, the
uncovering of an originary violence which negates history itself and undermines
any normative concept of law's legitimacy: lawmaking violence 'proves its worth
in victory' and establishes ends that law preserving violence serves (R: 286).
Thus, ironically, Benjamin must give up any decision on the possibility of the
justification of means, a decision about the status of violence, an account of
'justice', to the operations of fate (R: 294).
This formulation raises the question of critique; if this is to be a critique of
violence, a moment in its overcoming, rather than just a demonstration of its
unaVOidability, can Benjamin explain how the cycle of mythiC violence may be
broken? What force grounds his own critique?
In response to this problem, Benjamin introduces the concept of divine
violence, a power which destroys laws, and in so doing can only expiate (R:
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297). For Benjamin, this category of divine violence enables the thought of the
possibility of revolutionary violence, the overthrow of mythical forms of law.
This power, however, which Benjamin cryptically locates also in 'educative
power' (R: 297), to shatter the hold of mythic violence lacks what would seem
to be an important characteristic for the possibility of critique - it is not known
in advance (R: 298). Indeed Benjamin suggests that the decision over when and
how such violence has been or ought to be used in particular cases is neither
possible nor urgent (R: 300).
Here, as in his discussion of capital punishment, we see the problematic effect
of an economy of violence; its undifferentiated and effusive character, violence
per se as origin, prior to distinctions, means that every instance of violence (or,
although unsayable, 'injustice') is essentially bound, not to any particular law
(either as crime or punishment), but to law as a whole. So Benjamin, here the
anarchist despite himself, condemns as impotent those who criticise particular
laws or legal practices and not the whole law 'root and branch' (R: 285).
Two responses (but not only two) present themselves. The first is to affirm the
affinity of Benjamin's critical position, his beyond of violence, with pure
violence itself, to implicate not only law but critique in the economy of
violence. Derrida suggests this formulation, arguing Benjamin in part recognises
the law of iterability, that insures that
the founding violence is constantly represented in a conservative violence that
always repeats the tradition of its origin and that ultimately keeps nothing but a
foundation destined from the start to be repeated, conserved, reinstituted
(Derrida 1992: 55).

This approach is certainly consistent; yet this simply defers the question of how
meaningful critique is at all possible. The undifferentiated notion of violence
bound up in an ontological account of law as an economy of violence renders
the determinate negation of specific injustice impossible. Such an approach can

Law, Authority and Critique

183

apparently trace the violence of an experience of injustice to the inevitable
reiteration and displacement of an origin in the operation of the economy, but
the consequence is that neither the medium of law nor of critique (nor,
ultimately, their relationship) can be understood in a way that makes possible
the avoidance of a reiteration of violence either in this very act of diagnosis or
in their remedial employment.
Such an account lacks both the normative criteria by which to judge any
particular law, practice, or experience and also any heuristic value in guiding
transformations of such law or practice. Under these circumstances the
tensions that will always exist between law, justice and critique can certainly
only be perceived as aporia - and an uninstructive aporia at that, suspended
between the undecidability of violence and the singularity of a wrong without
possibility of mediation3. Such an approach puts emancipation beyond the
realm of cooperative human endeavour and into the realm of a divine violence;
and it also obscures the actual existence of just such a possibility of mediation,
in the form of ethico-normative potential and learning processes which
implicitly inform the critical views of those employing an economy of violence.
It takes untruthfulness to push reification back into Being and into a history of
Being, to mourn and consecrate as 'fate' what might perhaps be changed by
self-reflection and by the action that it kindles (Adorno 1990: 91).
The second approach is to press Benjamin further, to seek out the position or
possibility of a normatively significant, mediating sphere of non-violence.
Indeed, one can suspect that Derrida fails to appreciate the significance of
Benjamin's comments on the dialectic of lawmaking and law preserving in this
respect. This may occur because of Benjamin's highly idiosyncratic concept of
history (and of dialectic), which we will discuss below; however, it is also
certainly the case that it was not until much later (though the seeds were always
present, as we will see below in respect to the Critique ofViolence itse10 that
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Benjamin himself, under the influence of historical materialism, came to
attempt to explain his understanding of critique in terms of 'profane
illumination', as an explanation of how we can from within history unravel the
hold of violence over humanity (which is not to say he was ever optimistic
about it ever occurring!).
[A] n ecstatic component lies in every revolutionary act. This component is
identical with the anarchic. But to place the accent exclusively on it would be
to subordinate the methodical and disCiplinary preparation for revolution
entirely to a praxis oscillating between fitness exercises and celebration in
advance (R: 189-190).

This second approach points to the need for a conceptualisation of both a
concept of a learning process and of a normative potential that enables the
pOSSibility of a non-violent and profane concept of 'authority', one that could
perhaps explain an extra-legal but non-violent justification of law (or at least
provide us with a criterion for use by a critique of violence). However, for this
second approach to gain plausibility we need to briefly pursue Benjamin into
his account of language and history.4

(2) Language
Already in the Critique of Violence, Benjamin invokes the idea of a sphere of
non-violence; 'that sphere of human agreement that is...wholly inaccessible to
violence: the proper sphere of "understanding", language' (R: 289). To grasp
what it is that Benjamin means by the 'proper sphere of understanding' we
need to briefly remind ourselves of Benjamin's concept of language. In this view
we again see the struggle between the Messianic, Romantic and materialist
elements of Benjamin's thought.
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Benjamin sees in the proliferation of languages the sign of the Fall; Adamic
language, the giving of names, involved a perfect relationship between the word
and the object. This has been lost, however the echo of this relationship
remains in every language (and indeed Benjamin understands language as
fundamentally mimetic, a non-arbitrary relationship between word and thing)
(R: 314·320, 333-336). The (economy of) violence of the origin of every
language condemns it to a futile longing for reconciliation; its partiality is
caused by, and is a reminder of, the origin that this very fragmentation renders
irretrievable.
However, in the dimension of language Benjamin soon moves beyond this
ontological dualism; myth becomes secularised (Adorno 1995: 233). The
reconciliation of all partial languages now becomes the historical task of the
translator. For Benjamin, translation comprises not the accurate rendering of
the original into the new language - rather, a good translation expands the new
language in the direction of the original (1: 77).
To understand how it does so, and what this idea signifies, we need to take
hold of another important Benjaminian notion; that language seeks not to
communicate (transmit information) but rather to express (R: 316-317). For
Benjamin, the decline of language has been its reduction to the mere
transmission of information (the 'semantic element') at the expense of what it
expresses (often understood as the mimetic element). This transformation in
the nature of language is tied up with the liquidation of collective experience
[Erjahrung]. Now as collective experience is the condition of meaningfulness
of language, this change in the nature of experience entails the emptying out of
language, its reduction to mere information, with the simultaneous
internalisation and privatization of experience [Erlebnis] that renders the latter
incommunicable (1: 88-89). This change serves the perpetuation of myth, the
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transmission and repetition of information, the liquidation of meaning, where
the gates of a language slam shut, enclosing experience within silence (I: 82).
Translation, however, cannot communicate· it can only express, and as such
expands the potential of a language in the dimension of Erjahrung. Benjamin's
concern, the energy of his critique, is directed to the preservation of experience
[Erjahrung], the condition of understanding; thus also the sphere of nonviolent relations,
The critical theorist, like the translator, operates within the dimension of
history in a revolutionary-critical manner, gradually unpicking the strands of
myth and violence in the semantic potentials that exist within every language in
order to develop the realm of collective experiences [Erjahrungen]; this latter
is, ultimately, the key figure of thought in Benjamin's idea of emancipation.
(3) History

The nourishing fruit of the historically understood contains time as a precious
but tasteless seed (1: 254).
Now Benjamin is famous for his rejection of progress; the figure of the angel of
history powerfully evokes the image of progress as the accumulation of
catastrophe. Benjamin understands progress as the movement through empty
time, through myth (I: 252). So, the continuum of what we call history, through
which the movement of lawmaking and law preserving violence has taken place
is, for Benjamin, merely mythic time, which is why violence is inevitable. This
idea of progress is, however, immediately contrasted with history, which is the
subject not of empty time but filled by the presence of the 'now' [fetztzeit) (I:
252-253). History can only arise through critical (or divine) interventions into
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this cycle of myth in order to extract semantic potentials that could then be put
at the use of humanity. Benjamin's hope is that such breakthroughs in mythic
time will combine into a tradition, consolidated Eifahrungen (Habermas 1972:
138). In this way a progressive disentanglement of violence and non-violence is
to become possible as an historically situated and intersubjectively achieved
learning process which liberates or rescues elements of the past to break open
the limitations of the present (Wiggershaus 1994: 204). The bettering of the
conditions of humanity is an historical task.
It is this idea that Benjamin means by the presence of 'divine' violence in the

course of law's development. Important also for the interpretation of Critique
of Violence is that this idea of an explosion of the continuum of empty time is
what Benjamin understands as the dialectic 'at a standstill' (1: 254; see
Wiggershaus 1994: 204).

Terra Nullius and Determinate Negation

Returning to the essay on violence, we can now better appreciate Benjamin's
account of the dialectic of lawmaking and law preserving violence, and
demonstrate both why and how this moves him away from an economy of
violence. However, rather than examine Benjamin's example of the general
strike, in explaining this idea it may be more fitting to employ the example of
'terra nullius'.

Terra nullius is a doctrine that exemplifies Benjamin's lawmaking violence. It
grounds not only certain legal relations between indigenous people and their
non-indigenous cohabitants, but founds a whole legal system (this is why the
Mabo & Wik decisions, the 'wake' of terra nullius, are concerned with that most
central ofAustralian legal categories, or 'ends': property).

188

Ripperger

The (much) later integration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders into this
legal system would exemplify law preserving violence at work. In the same way
that Benjamin supposes the law granting a limited right to strike is an attempt
to annul a threat of violence (by the disenfranchised), here the law gives certain
rights (at a minimum, recognition or legal standing) to those whose exclusion is
the basis of the legal system itself (Cf R: 290). This law, however, must still fear
the lawmaking violence that the recognition of indigenous legal concepts would
entail - a rival lawmaking violence, one that directly contradicts the lawmaking
violence of terra nullius itself.
Eventually these contradictory forces collide. The operation of law preserving
violence ultimately weakens the lawmaking violence represented in it (R: 300).
So the moment arises -a claim for Native Title, that which cannot exist if the law
which derives its force from the doctrine of terra nullius is to be preserved, but
which is compelled by the existence of both other legal doctrines (for example,
the Racial Discrimination Act), which represent law preserving violence, and
the threat of lawmaking violence of the Indigenous people themselves . a
moment in which the whole complex of violence is concentrated: an economic
crisis. It is precisely such moments that Benjamin understood as dialectical.
Perhaps, then, we should instead try and understand the decision in Mabo as a
decision to 'blast a specific era out of the homogenous course of history' (1:
254). At this moment of decision, a dialectic at a standstill, law has an
opportunity to transcend its own principle of violence. As such it can avoid the
simple repetition of violence (becoming a new lawmaking violence), destined in
turn to decay, but rather be critically appropriated as part of that tradition
which develops every time the cycle of mythic law is broken through, as part of
the founding of a new historical epoch (R: 300).
Benjamin seeks to avoid the consequences of an economy of violence, and can
do so only by pointing out a dimension of human activity and history that
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emerges as a sphere of non-violence (though in no sense 'pure'). This sphere is
that of the struggle to appropriate a tradition of meaningful shared experience
over and against the dimension of mythic time. The critique of violence must
draw on this tradition in order to both make and justify its incursions into
mythiC time (I: 254).
Yet precisely what Benjamin still lacks is any positive consideration of what
constitutes the possible structural elements of tradition. 5 As such his critical
theory lacks a certain determinateness, any sense of mediation, of what
normative principle provides the dialectical force behind the Mabo decision
(Arato & Gebhardt 1993: 206). Whilst recognising the existence of a critical
counterforce (the 'law governing the oscillation' of lawmaking and law
preserving violence, a divine-historical law, not a mythic law) that enables
dialectics, it cannot give voice to its normative content (the same problem
afflicts Adorno - in this the notions of dialectics at a standstill and negative
dialectics draw together).
During Benjamin's lifetime, this shortfall could to some extent be compensated
for by the overwhelming ease of identifying the forces of oppression: Fascism
and capitalism, their mutual destruction of collective experience through the
instrumentalisation of nature, language and culture. This was complemented by
a naive Marxist normative orientation that looked to the organised proletariat as
the 'other' repository of lawmaking, if not revolutionary, violence (Cf R: 281).
Awareness of more subtle forms of violence, and a less naive understanding of
the normative structures of forms of social organisation (as supplied by
Foucault, Derrida and others), however, requires a more rigorous investigation
of the sphere of the non-violent in order to effectively provide grounds for
critique.
According to an economy of violence, the decision in such a case as Mabo will
represent a violence without a ground: either lawmaking, the introduction of a
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new order based on an authority which can only be legitimated retrospectively;
or a law preserving violence, a reaffirmation of prevailing law. In this way the
violence of terra nullius is perpetrated (as vengeful fate) or perpetuated. This
must be so because this perspective also allows no account of a normative
dimension whose critical force cannot be assimilated to a rival performative
violence but which is necessary for the very practice of critique.
Mabo is a case where the decision must be made over how and when an

expiating 'violence' is to be employed; the violence of terra nullius alone cannot
account for this, it gives us no guidance on what to do, indeed it gives us no
ground to distinguish itself as a violence of any particular concern. That this is
unsettling demonstrates a sensitivity that cannot itself be explained, but which
in fact signifies the deferral and displacement of the normativity at work in
these decisions (for as we know the decision that one is 'unsettled' is a
normative one). In order to explain our sense that the overthrow of terra
nullius is right (if not 'just' in an emphatic sense, due to its partiality) we need
to be able to uncover the grounds for the strong claim to normative authority,
the immanent ideal at work, in this decision; the wrong of terra nullius was not
established retrospectively by the new legal order which justifies its striking
down, rather it is the concrete experience of struggle and suffering of
indigenous people over the last two hundred years that indicts the principle of
terra nullius at its origin. This struggle is meaningful only with the adoption of
an ethico-normative perspective (Cornell 1987: 156-157). Only an
understanding of the normative potential of a struggle for recognition, the
normative ideal of reciprocal relations and a sensitivity to suffering, gives us the
ability to support the claim that the decision is right. 6
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Conclusion
The problem of an economy of violence is that a real violence occurs in the
obliteration of the ineliminable singularity of the concrete experience of
injustice through grounding it in an indeterminate notion of an economy of an
originary violence and its displacements. Not only does such a perspective deny
the specificity of the injustice, its historical and social configuration (including
an account of its origin in history, not merely as an effect or an event in the
economy of violence, but as an act for which someone is responsible), but it
disables critique, by first denying normative significance to that experience, and
second by lacking sufficient determinant content to enable a transformation of
current conditions through participation in an ongoing learning process.
What is occluded by the economy of violence is the relationship of law to
something other than its dimension of violence; for example, its relationship to
conditions of democratic legitimacy which are closely related to the normative
principle of equal recognition (this occlusion is what makes an economy of
violence itself appear plausible). Only this relationship, properly understood,
can explain the dialectical force of legal doctrines such as: the right to free
association (and democratic participation); anti-discrimination in the
recognition of legal claims; the demand for equal treatment of even noncitizens. The operation of such ideas can give us confidence (though never
certainty) that our decisions are right or wrong. Further, an economy of
violence obscures the fact that the struggle for recognition of groups and
individuals is what in fact draws the attention of critique to determinate
instances of violence in law (Honneth 1995a: 309; Honneth 1995b: 205-219). It
distracts our attention both from the specific constellation of social-historical
forces that are responsible for the perpetuation of the violence of the origin

192

Ripperger

and the potential of an ongoing learning process that provides both the
authority and guidance to correct such wrongs; it obscures how law as a
medium transforms and produces violence and non-violence, which is a vital
area of inquiry.
So while we may even follow Benjamin in describing the intervention into
mythic fate for the rescuing of semantic potentials in order to emancipate
humanity as a 'violence', we can not conclude that this jeopardises the concept
of a normative dimension of non-violence. This is because within a critically
appropriated tradition, including that of law, the violence of the origin is not
fated to repetition but rather its effects are capable of being transformed (and a
critical counterforce justified) via the normative learning process which they
become a part of. In this context the intervention takes on the other
significance of Gewalt - legitimate force, legitimated by the power of a sphere of
normative non-violent relations. We ought not confuse the force of law with
either violence or the legitimating power of a democratic polity; only such a
reduction makes an economy of violence appear plausible. This is not to imply
that in practice these forces can be easily distinguished, and certainly they never
appear 'pure'; nor is it to imply that in practice anyone of these forces has
ontological or temporal priority. What it does mean is that in any particular case
(of law or practice) the constellation of these forces can be subject to evaluation
and transformation. Thus even what originates in violence can be rescued and
employed as non-violence;
The blindfold over Justitia's eyes does not only mean that there should be no
assault upon justice, but that justice does not originate in freedom (Adorno &
Horkheimer 1992: 17).
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We can only hope that the 'violent' overthrow of terra nullius can be so
employed; but if we refuse to accept the obligation to investigate the normative
content of struggles for recognition and their relation to the 'profane
foundation of authority' of law in favour of an indeterminate concept of a
mystical violence as the ground of law, this opportunity will be lost.

Notes

1 Abbreviations in citations refer to texts as follows: R = Reflections (Benjamin
1986); I = Illuminations (Benjamin 1992).
2 1would like to thank the participants of the Law & Discourse Forum, Glebe,
Sydney, for stimulating discussion on this and related issues.
3 Derrida argues convincingly that the two perspectives which for him constitute
the moral dimension, that of 'equal treatment and respect' and the 'obligation to
the infinite singularity of the Other' exist in a productive tension that cannot be
reconciled, especially in law (despite law's increased sensitivity to the specificity of
its application). However, in his application of this insight to law three issues are
underdeveloped: (1) law has a special function in its relationship to morality
(understood broadly) - to stabilise generalised behavioural expectations in a
postconventional culture which relies on the weak force of moral insight for
motivation. This means law must be biased in the direction of 'equal treatment'
(which is not to imply insensitivity to particular contexts of application); (2) the
idea that the shift between the two perspectives, necessary for any concrete
decision, lacks 'ultimate' legitimation conceals the operation of fallible learning
processes, in both directions or dimensions of the ethical relationship as well as in
their interdependence or mediation. Note also that the lack of a determining
principle here, which as Derrida notes is actually a structural condition for the
possibility of a just, not simply a 'legal', decision does not imply that a decision
cannot be justified; (3) the authority of law is not simply tied to justice in the

194

Ripperger

comprehensive sense: it must satisfy the functional requirements noted in (1) as
well as satisfy the test of democratic legitimation, which as Derrida himself points
out, is more than a question of procedural 'legality'. Without this recognition, the
understanding of the relationship between law and justice will conceptually
dissolve the ethical medium of the social which in fact sustains both - and so the
'aporia' of justice migrates into law with an unnecessary loss of heuristic value.

4 Note that a more detailed argument would also examine Benjamin's account of
the ambiguous consequences of the destruction of the 'aura' of art, such as the
emancipatory potential of art (especially the democratic function of art reception),
and its relation to the idea of profane illumination.
5 Habermas doubts whether Benjamin's theory of experience is compatible with
dialectical or historical materialism despite Benjamin's intention announced in
"Theses on the Philosophy of History", precisely because Benjamin could give no
account of how a series of interventions could constitute a learning process
(Habermas 1972: 149-150).
6 Note that the key concepts of recognition and reciprocity need to be understood
from a postmetaphysical, post-'identity thinking', perspective. I attempt such an
account (and argue the need for such an account to make Derrida's two
perspective notion of justice available for Critical Theory) in 'Recognition,
NSymmetry and Decentred Autonomy', forthcoming (see also Honneth 1995a:
316-319).
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